When Vigilance becomes Audit, Justice becomes the Casualty

When Vigilance becomes Audit, Justice becomes the Casualty (जब विजिलेंस ऑडिट बन जाए, तो न्याय की हत्या तय है।)

Vigilance is meant to identify corruption, fraud, mala fide actions and abuse of official position—not to act as a second audit department. The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) has repeatedly clarified that vigilance action must be based on credible evidence and a clear vigilance angle, not on mere procedural or operational lapses. Yet, in many banking cases, (Presently I, can quote example of more than 10 live cases ) routine operational mistakes are bundled together to inflate charge sheets, while the real question—where is the vigilance angle?—is conveniently ignored.

Even more disturbing is the disregard for the Bank's own Staff Accountability Policy. The policy clearly provides that accountability should ordinarily be confined to officials connected with the preceding three years, should rely on audit observations of the previous four years, and that disciplinary proceedings should ordinarily NOT be initiated where lapses were not detected within two successive audits or beyond the prescribed period, except in cases involving fraud or mala fide conduct. It also states that mere procedural lapses, where an account became NPA due to external factors, should not be the basis for fixing accountability.

Instead of applying these filters, old cases are reopened after six, seven or even ten years, operational issues are portrayed as misconduct, and innocent officers spend years defending themselves. This wastes management time, demoralizes honest bankers, and diverts vigilance from genuine corruption.

Justice is not achieved by making charge sheets longer. It is achieved by making them fair, evidence-based, timely, and consistent with CVC guidelines and the Bank's own policies.

Vigilance should punish corruption—not criminalize bona fide banking decisions.